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INTRODUCTION
The issue of large-scale land acquisitions in Southeast Asia 
has generated significant scholarly and policy attention in 
recent years. In Lao PDR (Laos), the social and environmental 
controversies associated with the state’s policy of turning 
‘land into capital’ have now been closely documented. In 
many cases, companies pursuing large-scale land acquisitions 
in Laos have not followed the required legal investment 
procedures, circumvented regulations on land zoning and 
forest clearing, and have taken advantage of the limitations 
in state governance and regulatory capacities. Nevertheless, 
official approvals and political legitimation for large-scale 
land projects has been secured, though legal means, through 
the personalised support of key officials at times in exchange 
for commitments to build national infrastructure projects 
(Kenney-Lazar 2010; Dwyer 2013), or in other cases, through 
entering into joint venture partnerships with the state. The 
development of plantation concessions in Laos and across 
Southeast Asia often involves a rapid conversion of available 
land and timber rents into capital, and such forms of capital 
accumulation generally occur through the dispossession of 
marginalised rural and upland communities who do not hold 
formal, legal land tenure rights (Hall et al. 2011; Loehr 2012). 
Land concession development in Laos is however contested 
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and often unpredictable, and many approved projects fail to 
reach full implementation (Schönweger and Messerli, 2015). 
A political de-legitimation or obstruction of large projects may 
occur through the regulatory interventions of state institutions, 
through land-use competition from other concessionaires, 
through a loss of financing support or political backing, 
changing commodity prices, or in more limited cases, due to 
the mobilisation of local communities against dispossession.
In the many scenarios of extractive and locally coercive 
agribusiness development in Laos, the assemblage and 
circulation of new forms of ecological knowledge does not 
play a central role in the initial justification or legitimation 
of a project. There is little scientific ecological knowledge 
generated in such projects, and local people’s livelihood 
practices, environmental histories, and forms of knowledge are 
not documented or foregrounded. There are no environmental 
and social impact assessments conducted, and these projects 
do not enter into private certification systems such as through 
the Forest Stewardship Council, or the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards, or Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC). The new ecological knowledge 
that is produced through such projects can remain within the 
domain of private actors, and unavailable to the broader public.
In Laos, state agencies and development partner agencies 
have responded to ongoing controversies associated with large 
plantation concessions and community resource ownership 
through new policies to strengthen a rule-based legal 
framework. This has involved a series of unevenly enforced 
moratoria on new concession approvals, calls for improved 
investor ‘quality’ (UNDP and MPI 2012), the issuance of 
voluntary corporate codes of conduct, and the passing of new 
legislation and institutional reforms, including a draft National 
Land Policy, and future revisions to the Land and Forestry 
Laws. These interventions, however, represent attempts to 
improve regulation over a stubbornly opaque and politically 
complex land sector. Recent surveys estimate that 1.1 million 
ha in Laos have been allocated as land concessions to investors, 
by different levels of the government, most often with very 
limited publicly available project documentation (Schönweger 
et al. 2012).
In addition to the challenges of establishing and enforcing 
a legal framework, due to the spatially extensive nature of 
customary community land tenure and resource use in rural 
Laos, even the small number of fully legally compliant, ‘best-
practice’ land concession projects are required to engage in 
what might be called forms of ‘sustainable dispossession.’ 
By this, I refer to attempts to offset the negative social-
economic effects of resource enclosures on local farmers and 
communities, through a spatial intensification of livelihood 
activities achieved through new land-use regulations, new 
rural extension programmes, and provision of new agricultural 
technologies. In a smaller number of sustainability-oriented 
resource projects in Laos—relating to what Whitington 
(2012) has referred to as sustainability enclaves—it becomes 
particularly interesting to consider how new ecological 
knowledges are produced and enlisted into the logics, 
justifications, and imperatives of large-scale land acquisitions 
for commercial resource development.
My focus in this paper is a sustainable commercial pulpwood 
forestry project led by a major multinational forestry company, 
currently being implemented in a concession zone located along 
the former ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’ (HCMT) zone of southeastern 
Laos. I will examine the role that ecological knowledge (both 
expert-scientific knowledge, and knowledge of local ecologies, 
communities, and environmental histories that is generated and 
circulated by different actors), and corporate performances of 
sustainability have played in the relative success of the project 
to date, and the generally positive reputation of this project in 
the perception of many observers.
Through their knowledge production practices, media 
images, and performances, the case study plantation company 
pays close attention to the damaging outcomes of the Second 
Indochina War (1961–1975) in southern Laos, for local 
communities and landscapes. The project developer has 
completed a full suite of biodiversity and social-environmental 
impact assessment studies, implemented a participatory land-
use planning system, made credible commitments to securing 
international sustainable forest management certification, and 
has produced a significant amount of ethnographic and baseline 
livelihood data on the upland communities living within the 
project area. Much of this information is publicly accessible, 
and the firm has made significant efforts to promote public 
transparency. The project has also facilitated the visits of 
provincial and national Lao politicians to the remote project 
site, it has established linkages with international university 
programmes, and facilitated the field visits of visiting scholars 
and researchers (including myself).
This scope and extent of ecological knowledge production 
and circulation is not often evident in the practices and 
‘image repertoires’ (Whitington 2008) of other large resource 
companies operating in Laos, where a more typical strategy 
is to more stringently control or suppress the production 
and circulation of knowledge concerning social and 
environmental impacts. As interpreted below, there are some 
direct and practical reasons for the project’s attention to the 
environmental history and livelihood conditions of the area 
(there are war-era unexploded bombs littering the concession 
area). However, I assert there are also additional rationalities 
at work in this firm’s skilful production and dissemination of 
new ecological knowledge, which relate to the company’s 
efforts to establish an enhanced social and political ‘license 
to operate’ within Laos. I interpret this corporate production 
and dissemination of new knowledge of landscapes and local 
populations, and its crafting into a ‘moral theatre’ (Sioh 2010) 
of national rural development, as a competitive strategy, to 
secure large-scale access to (inexpensive) concession land, 
and establish broad political backing and legitimacy, within 
a context of non-scripted regulation, patronage, and illiberal 
governance in Laos’s plantation sector. While the production of 
ecological knowledge is important for the company’s access to 
international certification systems, and potentially to financing 
support from multilateral institutions, this paper focuses on 
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the role of ecological knowledge in the company’s efforts to 
build domestic political legitimacy, in a context of growing 
contestation over land in southern Laos.
In developing this argument, I draw upon three key 
literatures: ecological knowledge and science and technology 
studies; the production of socio-natures and the making 
of terrain and territory; and resource commodification as 
performance and spectacle. I approach ‘ecological knowledge’ 
as a multifaceted concept, but my specific interest is on how 
new knowledge of local communities, ecologies, and landscape 
histories, is produced by non-local, private sector actors, and 
circulated beyond project localities in rural Laos, in a way 
that facilitates corporate ‘action at a distance’ (Held et al. 
1999), and ultimately the enclosure and acquisition of new 
concession territories. Next, I outline these concepts in more 
detail, before turning to their application in the case study 
context of southeastern Laos.
APPROACHES TO ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
Examining the differential production and circulation of 
ecological knowledge in political ecology research can be 
useful for more closely identifying the rationalities and 
power logics that underpin environmental practices. Powerful 
knowledge systems privilege certain ways of knowing and 
governing nature, and marginalise other epistemologies; in 
this way social-political orders and the natural world can be 
conceived as co-produced (Jasanoff 2004). In this effort I am 
less interested in examining the relationship between local-
indigenous ecological knowledge and scientific knowledge, 
although this is an important one. Rather, I focus on the role 
of new knowledge actors, institutional arrangements, and 
environmental practices emerging in Lao resource governance, 
how both expert knowledge and local ecological knowledge 
are produced, circulated, and contested, and their effects on 
different social groups (Braun 2002). Secondly, I inquire how 
these new regimes of ecological knowledge and power are 
instrumentally applied in producing and governing capitalist 
nature, and how these knowledges are used in the making 
of new sustainable concession territories in Laos. Here I 
draw on geographers such as Stuart Elden, who conceives 
of ‘territory’, not as a pre-existing object, but of territory as 
produced through political-economic, political-strategic, legal, 
and technical practices, that ultimately enable a “….calculative 
grasp of the material world” (2010: 11). As Elden (2013: 10) 
forwards: “Territory is a political technology: it comprises 
techniques for measuring land and techniques for controlling 
terrain.” Territory and terrain can thus be conceived as created 
through methods of calculation and measurement, and as a 
hybrid of both physical landform and the product of politics 
and technology. Territory is an active agent in social activity, 
which can be critically analysed through genealogical methods 
(Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Elden 2010, 2013; Dwyer 
2014a). Drawing upon these tools and approaches, I examine 
the historical calculations and techniques of territory-making 
in southeastern Laos, from the Cold War military terrain as part 
of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to a zone of socialist state building 
and resource extraction, to a contemporary enclave site for 
sustainable global agribusiness investment.
The third concept I develop relates to the making of 
commodified nature and landscapes. Here I draw in particular 
upon Gavin Bridge (2001) to argue that it is often not simply 
a discursive emptying, forgetting, or erasure of local socio-
histories that can occur in the making of new extractive 
commodity production zones (see also Braun 2002; Peluso 
2009). Rather, a more nuanced form of selective erasure, 
re-encoding, and performance/spectacle can occur, whereby 
ecological knowledge is enlisted into what Maureen Sioh 
(2010: 468) has called a “…reconfiguration and imaginative 
recuperation of the physical landscape.” Incorporating insights 
from these and other ethnographic studies in southeastern Laos 
(Daviau 2004, 2011; Daviau and Vilaivong 2006; Chamberlain 
2008; Pholsena 2008, 2012), I show how a particular pulpwood 
forestry concession project in southern Laos has been 
transformed into a kind of political and moral theatre (Sioh 
2010) of national development, in which sustainability is a 
political and territorial strategy.
This analysis and discussion is based on local-level 
community fieldwork and villager interviews conducted in 
Savannakhet and Salavane provinces of southern Laos in 
the months of September 2008, June 2010, and May 2012, 
research interviews with and participant observation of project 
company staff, interviews with key informants in Vientiane 
capital, a review of available project documentation and the 
broader literature on Lao forest-land policy and the history 
of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Lao PDR. The three 
concepts introduced above—the production and circulation 
of ecological knowledge, the making of territory, and 
discourses and performances of commodification and national 
development—are applied to better understand the nature 
of new resource concession territories in the post-conflict 
landscapes of southern Laos.
KNOWLEDGE AND TERRITORY-MAKING 
IN THE LAO ANNAMITE RANGE
In the deep backwoods of southeastern Laos near the Vietnam 
border, if you find yourself driving down a rough cobblestone 
road, you can be certain that it was constructed by Viet Minh 
soldiers as an artery of the Ho Chi Minh Trail transportation 
network (McDonnell 1977). In May 2012, I was a passenger in 
an over-sized 4-wheel drive company vehicle, bouncing along 
one of these roads between southern Savannakhet and Salavane 
provinces. The driver, a former army man and logging truck 
operator, was working the clutch and grasping the steering 
wheel with intensity. He was enjoying driving though muddy 
tracks and across riverbeds, including the wide Xe Lanong 
river. In another couple weeks the rainy season would be in full 
swing, and the river too high to cross by even the largest trucks. 
Out the window, the swidden fields of local farmers extended 
high up the slopes of the Annamite range on either side of 
the road. It took us seven bumpy hours to travel the 100 km 
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between the district centres of Savannakhet and Salavane, at 
one point requiring the winch cable on the front of the truck 
to pull us out of a precarious situation.
These are challenging, frontier landscapes for a commercial 
investor, both in terms of southern Laos’ physical and social 
geography, and the legal regulatory environment. In Laos’ 
forest-land sector, there are often significant divergences 
between official central state policy, and local implementation 
(Singh 2012), which can introduce challenges in developing 
a commercial project. This can be due to constraints on 
government coordination, infrastructure and logistics, low 
local state capacities and budgets, unpredictable regulatory 
changes (such as successive moratoria on plantation 
development), the prevalence of discretionary decision-making 
by top officials, as well as the predilection of the central Lao 
state to formulate ambitious targets to which local officials 
must try respond. Nevertheless, over the past decade, Laos 
has attracted the interest of a number of large, multinational 
forest-plantation firms. And as a result of the last decade of 
ADB-Greater Mekong Subregion-sponsored road and export 
infrastructure improvements, the thinly-populated districts of 
eastern Savannakhhet and Salavane provinces are now located 
well within market distance (100–150 km) of deep water export 
ports in central coast Vietnam, and thus are highly connectable 
to the global economy (e.g., Vientiane Times 2013).
These landscapes of southeastern Laos are also the 
product of intensive conflict and military intervention, and 
here I further sketch out the implications of this history of 
knowledge production and territorialisation. This discussion 
is divided into three broad phases—1) the Second Indochina 
War years (1954–1975); 2) the first generation of post-war 
development in the new socialist Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (1975–2000); and 3) the last decade of economic 
liberalisation, regional integration, and foreign capital 
investment in Lao PDR (2000–present). Such political, military, 
and environmental histories crucially inform present-day 
policies, strategies, and technologies of state making, 
territorialisation, and ecological knowledge production.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail as military terrain
Recent investments in mining, plantations, and hydropower are 
not the first time that southeastern Laos has been incorporated 
into global networks and intensive efforts at state-making and 
territorial production. The town of Xepon (Sepone), located 
along Laos Route 9 near the Vietnam border, was originally 
the site for a small French colonial garrison outpost. Beginning 
circa 1958, the North Vietnamese military established the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail transportation network to South Vietnam, 
marking a major transformation of these sites and locations, 
from the periphery of French Indochina, to the frontlines of 
Cold War geopolitical conflict (High 2008; Pholsena 2008).
As Daviau (2004: 23) notes, the upland communities of 
Laos’ eastern Savannakhet province had the misfortune to be 
not only located along the north-south supply routes of the 
People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), but also to be located along 
the 17th parallel, the dividing marker between North and South 
Vietnam. From circa 1960–1973 these districts were sites for an 
aerial interdiction campaign against the HCMT by the US Air 
Force (Nalty 2005; van Staaveren 2005) and intensive ground 
operations, culminating in Operation Lam Son 719 at Xepon 
in 1971 (Nguyen 1979; Prados 1999; Sander 2014). Wartime 
military interventions played a significant role in producing 
ecologically degraded, and sometimes dangerous ‘frontier’ 
spaces of eastern Savannakhet and Salavane provinces, that 
now serves to make these forest-lands more amenable for 
conversion to industrial plantations.
In considering the post-colonial and post-conflict Lao state 
and production of territory in southeastern Laos, Elden’s 
(2009) insight into the etymological roots and historical 
connections between the concepts of territory and terror are 
suggestive. In the Annamite Range in southern Laos, between 
the bombing, defoliation, and ground invasion campaigns of 
the Indochina conflict, and extensive movements of people 
and materiel along the HCMT network, the landscapes and 
social systems in this region were significantly transformed. 
The Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos was, in a quite direct sense, 
‘produced’ as a contemporary upland ecological space through 
geopolitical conflict and military strategy. Through their 
efforts to exert strategic control over material terrain and local 
populations, military planners and combatants on both sides 
of the Indochina conflict played a key role in remaking these 
spaces and territories. Both the PAVN and the Pathet Lao 
(through creating the HCMT network under a mountainous 
and tropical forest canopy), and the US military and the 
Army of the People’s Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) (through 
carpet bombing, defoliation, and ground invasion campaigns) 
intervened through particular dimensions of terrain (Gordillo 
2015), and understandings and knowledge of local ecologies 
and landscapes. The harmful legacy of that conflict, particularly 
in the form of extensive unexploded ordinance (UXO), remains 
embedded within the forests and upland farmers fields today.
Contemporary private sector resource concessions in the 
uplands of southeastern Laos are embedded within, and 
overlaid upon, this environmental and social history of military 
violence. The co-production of landscape, military conflict 
and society has many practical implications for present day 
state-making and rural development efforts (Pholsena 2013), 
for how land is zoned, and how claims to resources are being 
organised and legitimated (see also Vandergeest and Peluso 
2011; Dwyer 2014a). As described further, state attempts 
to produce ‘calculable spaces’ (Elden 2009, 2013: 10) in 
southeastern Laos continued during the post-war period in the 
new People’s Democratic Republic.
Producing governable upland space in socialist Lao PDR
Through the post-war period, extending up to the present, 
forest-lands in many upland areas of Laos have been subject to 
intensive swidden cultivation, multiple rounds of logging, and 
a series of state projects including upland resettlement, focal 
site development land-use zoning, and resource concessions 
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(Lestrelin 2011; Lestrelin et al. 2012). The Lao state and the 
Lao People’s Revolutionary Party have sought to implement 
these programmes, including resettlement initiatives, through 
enlisting the support of different external actors and donors 
(Baird and Shoemaker 2007). In the immediate post-war period 
from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, forest and rural sector 
support was provided by Sweden, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, 
and a number of other eastern bloc countries. In the post-Cold 
War period, additional Western development agencies were 
invited into the country. More recently, regional and multi-
national companies have been important actors in rural areas, 
at times taking on quasi-governmental roles in concession 
enclaves. Contemporary rural development and resource 
management programmes in Laos can be understood within a 
longer history of attempts to produce bureaucratic ‘calculable 
space’ and governable state territories, although under quite 
a different framework as compared to the Indochina War, or 
during Laos’ period of high socialism.
Upland zones in the most distant districts of southeastern 
Laos have been only recently been incorporated into central 
Lao PDR state governance systems. The limited infrastructural 
and intervention capacities, and minimal state resources 
available for the production and circulation of new ecological 
knowledge in post-war Laos played a key role in this. Indeed 
through a de facto period of decentralisation extending from 
1975 to the turn of the century, institutions at the provincial 
and local scales of state authority in Laos, as well as Vietnam-
linked logging interests, were arguably the primary governance 
actors in many upland zones.
For the purpose of this analysis, what stands out with 
respect to land-use planning and village development 
initiatives during this period of state building in southeastern 
Laos (1975–2000) are the limits to effective generation and 
circulation of ecological knowledge. A relative paucity of 
detailed, digital mapping and surveillance technology (for 
example, maps of national forest categories, and external and 
internal village land-use boundaries, GIS systems, computer 
records of property zones and claims) is important here. To 
be sure, the reach of the early socialist state institutions in 
upland zones of southern Laos should not be underestimated 
(Pholsena 2012). Ambitious state programmes of resettlement, 
extractive logging, and shifting cultivation stabilisation were 
designed and rolled out, and these initiatives played a role in 
reconfiguring the territorial and socio-ecological regime of 
control during this period. While significant for many citizens, 
the overall governance achievements of the socialist Lao state 
remained fragile, especially outside of provincial or district 
centres. More intensive, finely-tuned, and locally-incentivised 
forms of management and control over upland resources 
and village populations, particularly as associated with fully 
commercialised, market-based production and enduring state 
territorialisation strategies, remained elusive. With the last 
decade of globalisation and foreign direct investment into Laos’ 
resources sector, both the systems of ecological knowledge 
production, and projects of state territorialisation, and social 
ordering, have transitioned into a more intensive phase.
CONTEMPORARY CONCESSION-BASED 
TERRITORIALISATION  
IN SOUTHEASTERN LAOS
 … commodity-supply zones are emerging in the 
contemporary period as spaces of incipient social ordering, 
sites of experimentation in which broader relationships 
between social actors are being contested (Bridge 
2001: 2169).
There are many examples, in Laos and elsewhere in the 
region, of private developers in alliance with state bureaucracies, 
discursively ‘emptying’ local customary-rights lands, framing 
local environments as underutilised, barren or degraded, and 
converting these sites into a simplified and devalued tabula 
rasa for commodifying nature and resources (Barney 2008; 
Barr and Sayer 2012, Baird 2014). New spatial technologies 
such as remote sensing can play a particular role in discursive 
processes of social and ecological erasure in a way that renders 
community landscapes as outside of socio-political context 
and environmental history (e.g. Robbins 2001; Doolittle 2010). 
Gavin Bridge (2001), however, also alerts our attention to a 
more nuanced process—involving a more selective discursive 
erasure of local socio-ecological histories, and a re-encoding and 
re-inscription of resource supply zones and local populations in a 
way that nevertheless reinforces the “hegemony of consumptive 
economies” (Nalepa and Bauer 2012: 420). In this way, primary 
commodity supply zones can be conceived as both material and 
cultural semiotic spaces, which are produced through particular 
configurations of power-knowledge. I now turn from an analysis 
of military and post-war interventions in southeastern Laos, 
to examining a case study plantation concession area as a 
‘sustainability enclave’ (Whitington 2012), and to how upland 
spaces in Laos are being re-framed and re-organised in relation 
to the actions of new actors, technologies, and new instrumental 
logics of knowledge production.
New knowledge-actors in the Lao plantation economy
I first met ‘Carl’ [a pseudonym] in 2005, in a Mekong-side 
provincial town in southern Laos. I was having dinner with 
two managers of another plantation company, after visiting 
their concession site. Carl pulled up in front of the hotel 
restaurant in a battered 4 by 4 truck; he was dusty and tired 
from an extended trip down the dirt roads in Laos’ backwoods 
near the Vietnam border, scoping out potential sites suitable 
for planting commercial trees. A long-term resident of Laos, 
Carl is a compelling and convincing figure in Lao’s forestry 
scene, whose expert and locally informed knowledge of rural 
development issues cannot be discounted. Over his years of 
residency in Laos, Carl has developed valuable knowledge of 
establishing tree plantation and wood processing operations, 
an informed understanding of Lao business procedures, and 
practical experience of working with Lao officials and state 
bureaucracies. Through his grounded knowledge of the most 
remote districts in Laos, Carl was convinced he knew where to 
locate a large-scale plantation project—in the deep southeast of 
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the country, down the old ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’, an area where 
there was plenty of bamboo and scrub-dominated swidden 
fallows, low population density, and the soils and rainfall were 
suitable for fast growing eucalyptus pulpwood trees.
As Carl provocatively asserted in a research interview, ‘land-
use conflict need not be an issue in Laos’ (Interview, August 18, 
2005, Vientiane). He well understands civil society criticisms 
of large-scale commercial plantation schemes, particularly 
regarding the enclosure and displacement effects that such 
projects can have for local communities maintaining informal 
resource management systems based upon swidden agriculture. 
Carl’s answer to this land allocation conundrum is to focus 
on identifying heavily degraded locations for commercial 
tree planting, paying close attention to the legal framework, 
adopting a more transparent and participatory approach to 
village land-use planning, and more effectively integrating 
food security and the livelihood requirements of upland villages 
within the objectives of a commercial plantation enterprise. His 
company’s approach is particularly innovative in that it seeks to 
resolve the land-use conflicts that bedevil commercial plantation 
projects, through an integrated eucalyptus-rice agroforestry 
alley-cropping strategy, that is also aimed at relieving land-use 
pressure on the existing upland swidden system, potentially 
boosting its productivity. Carl’s ship came in during 2008, 
when a major forestry firm made their decision to invest in Laos 
through a proof-of-concept trial plantation project, in the eastern 
reaches of Savannakhet province where he had made his initial 
surveys. He now acts as the project manager for this firm—and 
a type of knowledge broker—guiding the company through the 
practicalities of how to implement a fully legally compliant, 
transparent, and environmentally and socially sustainable, tree 
plantation project in the Lao uplands.
In the unevenly-regulated and non-transparent land sector 
in Laos, filled with overlapping claims and concessions, 
production and protection forests, community lands and state 
lands, and struggles over access to resources (Schönweger 
et al. 2012), Carl also needs to convince officials at different 
levels of the state that they should support his project over 
other, competing plantation initiatives in the same districts. 
Some of these other projects skirt around the legal regulations, 
and apparently secure tree planting areas through special 
arrangements with top officials. Instead, Carl’s firm has 
adopted a slower, more painstaking, bottom-up approach, using 
a participatory strategy. His company is closely following 
the new legal framework, engaging and building trust with 
villagers and local government officers, and promoting the 
project with various national figures in Laos. This is a task 
for which Carl is well suited, given his long residency in the 
country, his specific knowledge of upland Lao communities 
and their livelihood situations, and his long participation in the 
Vientiane business community. Through his personal approach 
to management work, Carl oversees the generation and 
deployment of new knowledge around the local environment 
and the local communities, applied in the service of justifying 
and providing enhanced legitimacy for the continuation and 
expansion of this commercial investment.
With decades of field experience and a grounded, ‘organic 
knowledge’, Carl can be seen as representative of a certain 
expatriate development subject (Whitington 2008; Dwyer 
2014b). Whilst his own personal and ethical motivations 
for this sustainable forestry project are important (and no 
doubt genuinely held), his professional subject-position 
is that of a manager of a large, profit based agribusiness 
project that requires secure access to thousands of hectares 
of low-cost plantation land. He plays a key role in brokering 
knowledge flows between local community sites, government 
agencies, and this global multinational firm that is seeking 
to establish productive agri-business assets in Laos, but that 
is also concerned with maintaining high corporate social 
responsibility standards. The ultimate aim is to link into legal-
sustainable certification systems, and to represent what the 
United Nations Development Programme in Laos has called 
‘quality investment.’
Ecological knowledge and a sustainability-oriented 
pulpwood concession project in Laos
The quality investment project, which serves as the focus of this 
section, is the pulpwood concession launched in 2008, that Carl 
is managing in south-eastern Laos. The parent firm, a leading 
global producer of pulp, paper and packaging, is generally 
considered as an industry leader in social and environmental 
sustainability, and is listed on a number of ‘green–ethical’ 
financial exchanges. At the time of research, the project was 
proceeding through a feasibility stage, and a relatively small 
area (about 1,600 ha, or about 5%) of the proposed company 
concession lease in Laos had been developed. The company is 
testing and refining their land zoning and village development
programmes as based on the agroforestry model, measuring 
growth rates and estimating the costing of land and UXO 
clearance, amongst other inputs. Pending approval from the 
company’s head office, and additional concession leases from 
the Lao government, the full implementation phase of the 
project would expand their holdings up to 35,000 ha over the 
coming years.
The company has five upland target districts, located in 
Savannakhet and Salavane provinces, along the Laos-Vietnam 
border. Within these districts, up to 350,000 ha of overall 
‘degraded and under-utilised’ forest-land has been identified as 
potentially suitable for tree plantation development under the 
state land-use planning framework. These landscapes can also 
be understood as customary, community-managed forestland 
spaces, which are foundational for the existing system of 
livelihood and socio-cultural production for dozens of upland 
ethnic minority villages. The presence of unexploded ordinance 
introduces significant practical obstacles for tree plantation 
development, although the clearance costs are potentially 
surmountable for a well-capitalised private developer. The fact 
is that there are rapidly dwindling locations in Southeast Asia, 
or indeed across the tropical world, where 35,000 ha of land 
might be located for commercial development. The underlying 
commercial value of these degraded forest-lands are revealed, 
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as these territories are enclosed from local communities and 
developed into high productivity agribusiness assets.
The project is being implemented in one of the most 
vulnerable locations in Laos in terms of livelihoods and welfare 
of the local population. These hinterland areas are populated 
by ethnic minority communities—identifying as Brou and 
Makhong in eastern Savannakhet province, and as Katang 
Pakoh, Ta Oy, Nye, and Katu in eastern Salavane. The five 
districts of Savannakhet and Salavane are included within the 
47 poorest districts in Lao PDR. In 2007, average household 
cash income in the project villages was USD 33 per annum. 
Local villagers are almost completely reliant upon local 
ecological resources for their livelihoods (Daviau 2004; Daviau 
and Vilaivong 2006). As indicated in company baseline data 
and other donor reports, despite extensive village landholdings, 
food insecurity is severe in these locations of Laos. It is not 
unreasonable to consider that a well-organised private sector 
agribusiness venture might provide some much-needed capital 
investment in these areas, which could boost smallholder cash 
incomes through new wage labour opportunities, access to 
technologies and markets, and could help to improve such 
precarious livelihoods.
In the current feasibility stage, the company is meeting 
an extensive list of legal and regulatory obligations relating 
to land concession development. These include land rental 
payments to local villagers, sub-district and district authorities 
for leased areas1, as well as company business and concession 
licenses, land clearing permissions at district and provincial 
levels, environmental and social impact assessments, quarterly 
environmental reports, corporate baseline social studies, and 
consultations with affected communities. The company aims 
to secure Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification for 
all of their managed plantations in Laos. It has expressed a 
commitment to social responsibility, including the boosting 
of food security, provision of cash income opportunities to 
communities through wage labour, contributions to health and 
education, and local business development, and the firm has 
established regular monitoring, reporting, and transparency 
procedures.
Legality and sustainability can thus be considered as an 
important brand marker for this company, and indeed it could 
be considered as critical for maintaining access to Western 
capital markets, funding agencies, and consumers. In a 2010 
interview with the Lao National Land Management Agency 
(NLMA), it was indicated that, at the time, this company 
was one of only two land concessionaires operating in 
Laos which had met the full legal standards and regulations 
related to land issues, including all land clearing permissions, 
payments of all concession lease fees, and completion of all 
required environmental assessment procedures (Interview, 
NLMA, Vientiane, June 2010). In terms of meeting national 
regulatory standards, and adopting international best 
practice certification systems, this company would seem to 
be operating under a different model as compared to most 
other ‘extractive’ forest-land sector concessionaires in Laos 
(Global Witness 2013).
A key agricultural innovation forwarded by this company in 
Laos relates to its spatial alley cropping model for integrating 
pulpwood trees with upland rice or cash crop production. The 
company has forecasted that intercropping of eucalyptus trees 
with upland rice can be conducted for the first two years of a 
seven year rotation, although after this the canopy begins to 
crowd in, and other shade tolerant intercropping options would 
need to be developed between years 3 to 7. The company 
is also proposing a staggered, 7-year rotational planting 
approach in each village (as opposed to developing the entire 
village plantation space in a single year). If closely followed, 
theoretically this could enable upland rice intercropping in 
each year. However, it remains to be seen how effectively 
this complex system would be implemented and function in 
practice, over multiple rotations on a project-wide scale, and 
some other industry actors in Laos are sceptical this system 
would be logistically feasible or profitable on a large scale 
(Anonymous interview, June 14, 2014). The extent of the socio-
ecological transformations introduced by the project will also 
not become fully apparent until the 35,000 ha implementation 
stage is completed.
The methodology of the company’s negotiations with 
communities and local governments for access to land is an 
important feature of the project. The land zoning process 
is based on the new Laos standard for ‘Participatory Land 
Use Planning’ (PLUP), which supersedes the previous 
Land and Forest Allocation Policy (LFAP) (implemented 
circa 1993–2003, see Lestrelin et al. 2012). A number of 
roadside villages in these districts of Savannakhet have gone 
through the previous LFAP process, although further afield, 
in eastern Salavane, the target villages have no previous 
exposure to any formal internal state land-use planning 
process. Under the company’s programme, all community 
spaces are to be re-zoned, in accordance with the new PLUP 
policy. The state land zoning process is ultimately being 
financed through the company, which potentially introduces 
a certain degree of conflict of interest into the ‘participatory’ 
planning process.
The company’s framework for land-use planning and zoning 
of plantation land involves a stepwise process, involving a 
mix of technological and social definitions and elements of 
the PLUP system.2 Notably, even in these more remote areas 
of Laos, there is no ‘empty space’ between the territories of 
different villages. According to a local company staff member, 
even National Production Forests and National Protection 
Forests in these areas of Laos are often “just lines on a map” 
(Author interview 2008). Areas within national state forest 
zones are most often fully claimed and settled by villagers, 
similar to the areas outside of these national forest zones. 
Thus, plantation space must be carved out of the patchwork of 
village-managed forest-lands, either through the participatory 
land-use planning process, or through more coercive means. 
This is formally accomplished through establishing the 
administrative concept of state-owned ‘degraded forest’ 
(Barney 2008; Barr and Sayer 2012). In this way, the distinction 
between villager land, state forest-land, and concession land, 
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must be politically negotiated in every village, for every large 
plantation development project in Laos.
For the purposes of this paper I will set aside normative 
judgements concerning the present and future livelihood 
outcomes of this case study project for local communities. 
One can simply note that villages in these areas of Laos 
face extreme livelihood vulnerability. There is certainly the 
potential for this agribusiness investment project to stimulate 
broad improvements to local livelihoods, although this is 
by no means guaranteed. Further and more extended local 
research would be required to gain insight into understanding 
how participation is being managed, and how disputes are 
being handled in the land-use planning process between 
local communities, the company, and district, provincial, and 
national authorities. From my personal fieldwork observations 
to date, the company appears to have taken significant care to 
secure appropriate village consent before developing plantation 
lands, and in one particular case I observed, has taken careful 
steps in resolving a local negotiation disagreement. If the 
company formally adopted a Free Prior and Informed Consent 
policy (which they have not to date), a key question is whether 
in the authoritarian political context of Laos, villagers would 
actually hold a right of refusal in ceding customary land to the 
company through the land concession programme.3
My primary interest here is to examine the logics of 
knowledge production that enables this company to gain access 
forest-land for commercial development. I argue that what 
stands out in this company’s approach is the intensive nature 
of the production and circulation of sustainability-oriented 
ecological knowledge. What also makes this company’s 
sustainability strategy particularly intriguing, is that it may 
not be successful. There are other competing concessionaires 
willing to curry favour with elite decision makers and secure 
access to land through more direct ‘top down’, non-transparent, 
and coercive land acquisition strategies. There are also policy 
measures within Laos that have constrained new concession 
approvals for investors (most recently Prime Minister’s 
Order No. 13/PM 2012, invoking a moratorium on approval 
of new eucalyptus and rubber plantation projects to 2015, 
see Vientiane Times 2012, 2015), and Laos is in the process 
of drafting a new Land Policy, Land Law, and a Forestry 
Law, which could again alter the investment framework. 
In the future, the head office of the company could decide 
that progress has been too slow, the land zoning process too 
difficult to negotiate, commodity markets have changed, or the 
financial costs of this project in Laos are proving too high to 
produce an adequate rate of return. In comparison to some of 
the company’s competitors, adopting a slow, methodical, and 
transparent approach, drawing heavily upon the transparent 
production and dissemination of new ecological knowledge, 
could therefore involve some business risk.
In this general context, what is especially interesting is how 
the company neither seeks to erase the presence of upland 
communities from their concession area, nor to underplay 
aspects of local-environmental history. Rather, portrayals of 
local people, evidence of war-era destruction of landscapes, 
and the remaining threat of UXOs, feature quite prominently 
in the company’s published images and documents. The 
people I met who worked for this company often displayed a 
strong commitment to clearing UXO from the landscape, and 
to contributing to the company’s community development 
initiatives. Indeed, at a reported cost of USD 700 per hectare 
for de-mining operations down to a vertical depth of 30 cm 
into the soil profile, a 35,000 ha project could entail an outlay 
of up to USD 25 million in unexploded ordinance clearance 
alone. Even though not all areas are likely to require 100% 
clearance, clearly this is not a minor undertaking, and the 
company has promoted their UXO strategy as a key part of their 
justification and legitimacy, both with Lao decision makers and 
international observers. In contrast, there are other examples of 
plantation firms operating in southern Laos that also have UXO 
contamination in their concession areas, but that have to date 
circulated very little information or documentation on either 
ordinance removal or their social-environmental strategy. For 
the case study company, UXO clearance is a key pillar in their 
representation as a responsible corporate investor in Laos.
The company’s knowledge-based sustainability model, 
and their claims to concession land, is further supported 
by an NGO-style attention to local livelihoods. The firm’s 
high degree of media sophistication—presenting compelling 
images of local people enjoying enhanced livelihoods and food 
security through the company’s intercropping programme—
marks a clear distinction from other private sector plantation 
operators in Laos. Given the presence of potential competitors 
for access to plantation land in these districts of Laos, a long-
game strategy of slowly building a track record of social-
ecological sustainability, and developing positive relationships 
with local communities and officials, can be understood not just 
as good corporate social responsibility, but also as a particular 
strategy used by the firm for securing forest-land access. In 
author interviews, company manager Carl has at times voiced 
frustration with government officials, who reportedly tie up 
the company with regulatory knots and hurdles, and requests 
for ‘per diems’ and other supporting expenses, while other 
competing firms are said to strike non-transparent deals with 
decision makers, and have large land concession survey blocs 
in nearby areas approved with expediency.
In many ways the project forwards a sympathetic claim. 
Who could not be in favour of removing dangerous UXO 
from a post-conflict landscape? Who would disagree with due 
process, rule of law, environmental-social impact assessments, 
and participatory land-use planning? Who could argue against 
poverty reduction through village development interventions, 
and the provision of new agricultural extension services with 
increased yields, community infrastructure, improvements 
in health and well-being, and new income generation 
opportunities? The company’s assertions of environmental and 
social sustainability are made more compelling by the lack of 
any obvious alternatives for local economic development in 
these areas of Laos.
A key issue at stake is gestured towards by Bridge’s 
(2001: 2155) notion of how local socio-natural spaces slated 
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for conversion to export commodity production become 
“simultaneously emptied and full.” I conceive of the ‘empty-
full’ paradox as a discursive process of selective erasure and 
re-encoding of landscape meanings, achieved in part through 
the generation of performances and spectacles of sustainability, 
through which new forms of ecological knowledge and new 
ideologies of nature and development are produced and 
legitimated.
Selective patterns of landscape erasure emphasise villagers’ 
poverty, food insecurity, and safety problems due to UXO, and 
render these issues as objective, naturalised facts, sidestepping 
a deeper analysis of the historical and geo-political sources 
of these problems. As mentioned, in the company’s image-
repertoire, there is close attention to the historical effects 
of the war, as shown with aerial photographic images of 
cratered, swidden-dominated and scrub landscapes. What is 
under-emphasised in the company’s images and narratives is 
closer attention to the existing ways in which villagers are 
engaging with, and managing, these landscapes. This includes 
local swidden practices, cattle grazing, and non-timber forest 
product livelihood systems (including, controversially, illegal 
collection of UXO and prized luxury rosewood collection and 
sale), their histories of landscape occupancy and resource 
management, and other cultural-environmental practices 
(for example in the way local people regard the landscape as 
inhabited by spirits). To be sure, the company has undertaken 
extensive baseline studies on resource use patterns, which is a 
key source of new knowledge production, in a way that most 
other resource firms in Laos avoid. However, this corporate 
documentation avoids deeper and more probing questions 
regarding the nature of project interventions into the customary 
and cultural landscape. The company’s image repertoire avoids 
presentation of alternative local futures that do not involve 
the company. This is not a surprising observation—as the 
developers are ultimately profit-oriented actors, seeking to 
establish the legitimacy of their own project.
The issue of UXO is enlisted into the project’s representations 
in a nuanced manner. UXO as a problem is incorporated into a 
broader discourse of ecological degradation by the company, 
that generally devalues local forestlands, and effectively 
renders these spaces more easily, and more cheaply available 
for investors. To be sure, UXOs are a real and potentially 
deadly problem in these districts, and it should be reiterated 
that the company is one of the few private sector actors 
who are actually addressing the problem on the ground in 
an effective manner. Nevertheless, what is underplayed are 
practical alternative options for the development of local 
communities, or for improvements to the productivity of these 
upland agricultural systems, which do not involve allocating 
large areas of villager land to a private concessionaire for 
the next fifty years, and re-zoning community spaces as a 
global agri-business supply zone. More direct and progressive 
notions of social and ecological justice are also set aside in 
this framework—for example in the idea that the American 
(and Vietnamese) governments, through donor assistance 
programs, might be doing more in terms of war reparations and 
UXO clearance in Laos. Notions that local communities hold 
an inherent right to their homeland territories that should be 
upheld through a more rigorous programme of Free Prior and 
Informed Consent; or the idea that local communities deserve 
a greater share of the land rents and potential profits accruing 
from this project, perhaps through entering into company-
community joint equity agreements, are also underplayed.
For scholars such as Gavin Bridge (see also Baird 2008), 
the discourses of development that are applied in producing 
extractive resource concession spaces out of customary 
territories ultimately needs to be considered as colonial in 
character:
 Such narratives are colonial in that they naturalize and 
legitimize hierarchical distinctions between extractive and 
consumptive economies, and displace into the abstract, 
technical realm of resource economics fundamentally 
sociopolitical questions about contemporary and future 
uses of land. As such they facilitate the annexation and 
enrolment of lived-landscapes as resource-supply zones 
to the extra local economy (Bridge 2001: 2160–2161).
Building further on Bridge’s (2001) analysis on the making 
of extractive territories, subsequent to erasure, I forward that 
a re-encoding of the landscape in this project takes the form 
of new discursive and material interventions that establish 
and legitimate plantation territories and a new, state-corporate 
controlled, plantation economy. Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
in Laos, the project developers are mapping and re-organising 
customary forest territories into a new, rationalised, and 
industrialised agroforestry complex—achieving in concrete 
reality what Lestrelin et al. (2012: 2) call a “…territorial 
projection of particular socio-environmental perspectives 
and values.” Spatial re-encoding of the landscape includes 
new forest re-zoning and the participatory land-use planning 
process used by the company, and the assemblages of practices 
and discourses that enable the replacement of a customary 
swidden agro-ecosystem, with scientific-commercial 
agricultural practices, under the guidance of a new, corporate-
led rural development paradigm.
The strategies associated with this active re-encoding of the 
landscape include compelling images of the company’s high 
productivity agroforestry intercropping model, with smiling 
farmers in lush upland rice fields. Significant ecological 
knowledge about local peoples and ecologies is generated in 
this re-encoding process, and applied in the re-territorialisation 
of community landscapes. As Sioh (2010) writes with respect 
to the making of new plantation spaces in post-colonial 
Malaysia: “Territorializing Malaysia required both physical 
reconfiguration and imaginative recuperation of the physical 
landscape.” In Laos, the subjectivities and livelihoods of local 
farming households are unevenly transformed through this 
governance model of concession-based national development 
(Barney 2011). New developmental identities are promoted, 
as formerly marginal, ‘less productive’, and environmentally 
recalcitrant ethnic minority swiddeners are encouraged and 
incentivised to become modern farmers, and enlisted into 
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the mainstream Lao system of sustainable agri-business 
production.
Lastly, I forward that performances and spectacles of 
sustainability assist in the advertising and legitimation of 
project development. Project legitimacy is enhanced through 
the prosaic, everyday practices of sustainable concession 
development, as well as through more high profile ‘image-
spectacles’, performed by the developer for national and 
international consumption. In the case concession project, 
performances of sustainability can involve everyday visits by 
company staff to local project villages, meetings around village 
development and land-use planning, or farmer study tours of 
other project villages. Grander ‘spectacles’ of sustainability 
have involved high-profile helicopter visits from members of 
the Lao Politburo and the National Assembly, and executive 
decision-makers from the corporate head office, to project 
sites. In part through these practices and nation-building 
spectacles, the marginal uplands of eastern Laos, these poorest 
districts in the country, are being transformed into productive, 
sustainable, and profitable global commodity supply zones. 
A re-organised and newly disciplined landscape serves as a 
stage, a ‘moral theatre’ in the Lao hinterlands, for performances 
of agribusiness development, scientific and environmental 
rationality, and productive nation-building after a devastating 
Cold War conflict and an isolationist interregnum (Sioh 2010). 
I forward that the production and circulation of various forms 
of ecological knowledge has played a key role in each of 
these successive transformations in southeastern Laos, from 
the unruly and dangerous spaces of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to 
a remote post-war frontier site for building state socialism, 
to a new commodified and regulated, sustainability enclave.
CONCLUSION
 … the production of nature in colonial discourse did not 
occur through a straightforward erasure of Native presence. 
Dispossession did not hinge on ignoring Natives; it hinged 
on how they were described and incorporated within orders 
of knowledge — Braun (2002: 61; original italics).
In this paper, I have argued that the making of calculable 
plantation concession territory out of the battlefield terrain 
of the Indochina War in southeastern Laos forms the latest 
in a series of governmental interventions, part of a changing 
historical, political and technological effort for producing and 
controlling geographical space and producing more governable 
upland subjects. I assert that the case study company 
proactively produces and circulates new forms of local social 
and ecological knowledge, and strategically engages with 
the particular material landscapes in which they are working. 
The corporate strategy in play can be considered as a specific 
reaction to previous controversies around the displacement 
effects of industrial tree plantations, and as a requirement for 
accessing advanced capital and consumer markets. The role 
of particular development subjects such as that of plantation 
manager Carl, in how development interventions are shaped, 
is also key in how this story plays out on the ground in Laos. 
Most crucially, I view the practices, performances, and image-
spectacles of pro-poor sustainable resource development as 
part of an effective corporate approach for securing project 
approvals, and for gaining access to concession territory, in a 
contested and often opaque regulatory environment.
The ecological knowledge being generated by the plantation 
developer is nevertheless selective and partial. Ultimately, it 
functions in a broadly neoliberal development model, in which 
primary production zones are carved out of lived community 
spaces for integration into a corporate-dominated, global 
resource economy. What is arguably ultimately at stake in 
this process is the notion of community rights to land, versus 
local appropriation (RRI 2013). Under a more assertive rights-
based approach, impoverished upland Lao villagers who 
have experienced such hardship arising out of the Indochina 
conflicts and the years of post-war socialist isolation, would 
maintain access to a local form of sustainable development 
through which UXO is removed, their living standards are 
raised through new commercial opportunities and assistance, 
and through which they maintain a mix of community and 
individual decision-making control over their historical 
village territories. This would involve quite a different model, 
compared to a concession-based development programme by 
transnational corporations, that is ultimately backed by the 
coercive force of an authoritarian state, whereby non-local 
beneficiaries (including the central Lao state and corporate 
shareholders) would control the majority of resource rents and 
potential revenue surplus.
In place of such debates, and in the apparent absence of 
practical and realistic alternatives, I argue that the case study 
company is producing a new and, in many ways, a highly 
compelling narrative, whereby the economic development of 
these upland forest-land areas of Laos will be managed through 
corporate investment. In this process, the unruly social-natural 
landscape of the old Ho Chi Minh Trail is enlisted into forms 
of political and cultural spectacle—a kind of ‘moral theatre’ 
(Sioh 2010), whereby private actors and the Government of 
Laos use the resource concession system, foreign investment, 
UXO removals, and neoliberal poverty indicators, to promote 
sustainable (extractive) development. This ‘sustainability 
enclave’ underway in southeastern Laos is particularly 
interesting for a number of reasons. The future of the project 
is still open, and is potentially subject to future policy change, 
perhaps even circumvention by other competitors for land who 
are unconstrained by a corporate sustainability framework. 
Although I have not analysed this in great detail, there are 
indeed indications that the project holds significant promise 
for delivering tangible livelihood benefits for an impoverished 
local population (although starting from such a low per capita 
income base, achieving ‘success’ on this front should not be 
overly difficult). In this way, the project seems to represent a 
departure from the dystopian coercive ‘land grab’ scenario in 
Laos. The qualitative conceptual difference I point to in this 
paper is the distinction between the production and circulation 
of ecological knowledge as a minimal response to regulatory 
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requirements, versus knowledge production of local ecologies 
and populations as a more central and generative component of 
a project’s justification and legitimation; a source of productive 
innovation, and potential competitive advantage. Through such 
landscape enclosures and processes of re-territorialisation, 
through the described ecological knowledge practices, and 
the strategic use of performance, images and spectacle, new, 
sustainable, ‘concession empires’ are being born in Laos, and 
new socio-spatial and economic hierarchies are legitimated.
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NOTES
1. Company fund payments include: Village Development Fund: 
Total of approximately USD 360 per hectare for 50 year period, 
50% paid upfront, other 50% paid in installments every 7 
years; Subdistrict Development Fund: approximately USD 
5 per hectare for 50 years 100% paid upfront; and District 
Development Fund: approximately USD 21 per hectare for 50 
years 100% paid upfront (fieldnotes, May 2012). 
2. The formal steps include:Use of updated SPOT satellite imagery 
which shows areas of tall forest and degraded forest/swidden 
burns, ground-truthed through GPS (tall forest not available for 
tree plantations). Overlay with topographic maps which indicate 
terrain steepness (slopes over 25 degrees are not available for 
plantation development). Overlay with state maps of National 
Protected Areas, National Production or Conservation Forest.
	 •  Mapped and ground-truthed village border delineation 
with village representatives and leaders from neighbouring 
villages
	 •  Overlay with village PLUP system which show village 
conservation forest, production forest, protection forest, 
and spirit forest, housing areas, wet-rice fields, and 
roads, amongst other categories. This produces a map of 
‘potentially suitable’ plantation areas
	 •  The company then ensures that sufficient spaces of swidden 
managed/degraded forest are set aside for each household 
to still have sufficient space to conduct 1 ha of swidden on 
a seven year rotational basis
	 •  A participatory process is then organised whereby the 
company, with government officials, meets the villages 
and agrees upon the areas to allocate for tree planting.
3. Based on the available literature and author village visits, there 
is some early evidence at this point for beneficial economic and 
agricultural outcomes to local villagers, in terms of the payments 
offered by the company for land access (2.8 million kip per 
hectare, 50% of which is paid upfront), access to wage income, 
and improved rice yields in the first years of the intercropping 
arrangement (field research, 2008, 2010, 2012). These benefits 
need to be placed in the context of villagers’ loss of access to the 
forest-lands in question for the next 50 years of the concession 
period, and possibly compared to the counterfactual scenario 
of the benefits and profits that villagers could have enjoyed 
under alternative community development options. Notably, 
in a Rapid Participatory Biodiversity Assessment conducted 
in 2008 by IUCN, certain issues were reported with the 
‘participatory’ component of the company’s land-use planning 
process, whereby it was noted that villagers perceived the 
company-supported land-use planning sessions to be top-down 
government exercises in identifying land for the company.
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